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REASONABLENESS OF SURGICAL INTRUSION
This flexibility, however, will be gained at the expense of consistency between lower courts' decisions. This Note concludes that this tradeoff is inherent in instances involving a "reasonableness" approach and that lower courts can capably balance the facts and circumstances of each case under the Winston guidelines. The Supreme Court, however, should have more carefully delineated how to weigh the factors that determine "reasonableness" in order to provide greater guidance to lower court judges and to curb potential abuses of judicial discretion in applying the test.
II. FACTS OF WINSTON
On July 18, 1982, Ralph Watkinson observed an armed man approaching as Watkinson was locking his shop. 7 Watkinson drew his gun and was told by the other person to freeze, after which an exchange of gunfire appeared to injure both." Twenty minutes later, and eight blocks from the incident, the police found Rudolph Lee suffering from a gunshot wound to his left chest area. 9 Watkinson identified Lee as the assailant when Lee entered the same hospital emergency room as Watkinson. 10 The police subsequently charged Lee with four felony counts. 1 ' The Commonwealth of Virginia moved in state court for an order directing Lee to undergo surgery using a local anesthetic to remove what was thought to be a bullet from under his left collarbone. 12 Evidentiary hearings were conducted on the motion before the state trial judge.' 3 Based on expert testimony of surgeons, the motion to compel surgery was granted.1 4 Lee unsuccessfully appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court' 5 and subsequently brought a federal action to enjoin the operation on fourth amendment grounds.' 6 The federal district court refused to grant a pre-7 Id. at 1614.
id.
9 Id. 10 Id.
I1
Id. Lee was charged with attempted robbery, malicious wounding and two counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony. Id.
12 Id.
Id.
14 Id. at 1614-15. The expert testified that an incision of only one-half inch was necessary to recover the bullet believed to be just beneath the skin. Id. at 1614. He testified, furthermore, that surgery could be performed under local anesthesia and would result in no danger to Lee. Id.
15 Id. at 1615. Lee petitioned for a writ of prohibition and/or a writ of habeas corpus. Id. 16 Id.
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW liminary injunction.' 7 Just prior to surgery, x-rays revealed that the bullet was lodged substantially deeper than thought by the state court when it granted the motion to compel surgery.' 8 As a result, the surgeon recommended a general anesthetic.' 9 Lee subsequently moved the state trial court for a rehearing that was denied. 20 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the denial. 2 1 Lee then moved successfully in federal court to enjoin the surgery. 22 A divided United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling. 23 The court of appeals found that the surgery would impose too much risk, uncertainty, and intrusiveness on the subject, and would go beyond legitimate state police practices allowable under the fourth amendment. 24 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a state, consistent with the fourth amendment, may direct a suspect to undergo surgery requiring a general anesthetic in order to search for evidence of a crime. Schmerber was convicted of drunken driving 28 after being arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for injuries. 2 9 A physician drew a blood sample from Schmerber at a police officer's direction which revealed that Schmerber was intoxicated. 3 0 Schmerber contended, in part, that taking the blood sample was an illegal search and seizure in violation of his fourth amendment rights, and therefore, could not be received as evidence at trial. (1952) , the Supreme Court, based on a violation of due process, reversed a state court conviction which had permitted the use of evidence obtained by police who had ordered that the suspect's stomach be pumped in an attempt to recover morphine capsules. In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), the Supreme Court, based on the due process clause, balanced individual bodily invasion against the state's interest in deterring drunk driving to affirm a state court conviction which permitted as evidence the result of a blood sample taken from an unconscious drunk driving suspect by a hospital physician.
In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the exclusionary rule was adopted to protect fourth amendment rights to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures in federal prosecutions. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the exclusionary rule was applied to the states. The Rochin and Breithaupt decisions came prior to Mapp. The Schmerber and Winston cases, however, were decided after Mapp, and a fourth amendment analysis was therefore applicable in both cases.
32 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768. In determining that the police were justified in requiring a blood test, the Court reasoned that a search warrant was unnecessary because the officer may "reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence.'" Id. at 770 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). In a drunken driving case such as Schmerber, the percentage of blood alcohol drops when drinking stops, with a resulting destruction of probative evidence. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71. Similarly, in a bullet removal case such as Winston, bullet markings may quickly corrode while in the human body, thereby lowering the bullet's probative value. Winston, 105 S.Ct. at 1619. A pre-surgical adversary hearing and appeal were required, however, in United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977)(defendant's fourth amendment rights unabridged by court-ordered surgical removal of superficially-lodged bullet from his arm). The issue of the necessity of obtaining a warrant for surgical searches is therefore moot.
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW the fourth amendment. 3 3 In holding that the police were entitled to secure a blood test as an appropriate incident to arrest, and that the means used did not contravene the fourth or fourteenth amendments, 34 the Court did not disregard society's interest in maintaining individual integrity. The Court cautioned that "the [fact that the] Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions. 35 The decision in Schmerber provided a basis for lower courts 3 6 to strive to understand what is "reasonable" under the circumstances. The Court in United States v. Crowder 3 7 followed the Schmerber rule. In Crowder, a court ordered the surgical removal, under a local anesthetic, of a bullet from a murder suspect's arm without his consent. 38 The district court judge received the bullet in evidence and the court of appeals ruled that the defendant's fourth amendment rights had not been not abridged. 3 9 The Crowder court used language from Schmerber to justify its decision to extend the reasonableness framework into the new context of court-ordered surgical intrusions: "'the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.' "40 The court of appeals concluded that surgical intrusions should be allowed if a court finds:
(1) the evidence sought was relevant, could have been obtained in no other way, and there was probable cause to believe that the operation would produce it; (2) the operation was minor, was performed by a skilled surgeon, and every possible precaution was taken to guard against any surgical complications, so that the risk of permanent injury was minimal; (3) before the operation was performed the District Court held an adversary hearing at which the defendant appeared with counsel; (4) thereafter and before the operation was performed the defendant was afforded an opportunity for appellate review by this 33 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768. In determining that the blood test was reasonable, the Schmerber Court reasoned that the test was performed by a hospital physician within accepted medical practices, and that the test was effective, routine, and involved "virtually no risk, trauma, or pain." Id. at 771. In Winston v. Lee, the United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the appellate couft's decision holding that to compel surgery would be an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment and would violate Lee's right to be secure in his person. 4 2 Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. He relied heavily on the analytic framework of Schmerber in determining the constitutionality of state compelled surgical intrusions. Justice Brennan found the procedure in Winston to be an example of the "more substantial intrusion" cautioned against in Schmerber.
3
Justice Brennan stated that compelling surgery may be unreasonable even if criminal evidence would likely be produced because it implicates such high privacy and security expectations. 44 He determined, further, that "reasonableness" depends upon a case-bycase approach in which an individual's privacy and security interests are balanced against society's interest in performing the procedure in order to gain evidence to attempt to determine more fairly guilt or innocence. Justice Brennan stated that the lower courts had properly applied the Schmerber balancing test. 46 In particular, he reasoned that the vast medical uncertainties 4 7 and severe intrusion upon the privacy and bodily integrity interests that would result from this surgery dearly outweighed the Commonwealth's need to retrieve the bullet. 48 Justice Brennan remarked that use of a general anesthetic without the patient's consent and searching beneath the suspect's 44 Id. at 1616. Justice Brennan stated that "a compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence, however, implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to produce evidence of a crime." Id.
45 Id. More specifically, the factors determining "reasonableness" include: the level of the procedure's threat to the individual's safety; the extent of intrusion upon the individual's dignity, privacy, and bodily integrity; and the community's desire to accurately determine guilt or innocence. Id. at 1617-18. 46 Id. at 1620. 47 Id. at 1618-19. Medical evidence in the record revealed among other things, disputes about the depth of the bullet, the size of the incision that would be required to remove the bullet and the length of the operation. Id.
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[Vol. 76 skin for evidence of a crime "involves a virtually total divestment of respondent's ordinary control." 4 9 The Court stated that, notwithstanding the bullet, there should be sufficient evidence to prove that Lee was the assailant. 50 Justice Brennan noted that in cases with lesser expectations of privacy, 5 ' or where minimal intrusions on privacy interests are involved in the search, 52 the Supreme Court has less stringently applied the fourth amendment's protections. 5 3 Lastly, concerning the "reasonableness" of fourth amendment searches, Justice Brennan suggested that "when the State seeks to intrude upon an area in which our society recognizes a significantly heightened privacy interest, a more substantial justification is required to make the search 'reasonable.' "54
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist concurred in the judgment, and Chief Justice Burger concurred in a brief separate opinion. 55 Chief Justice Burger stated that he joined because he interpreted Justice Brennan's opinion as not preventing reasonable individual detentions if bodily functions may disclose internally secreted con- 53 Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1620. 54 Id. 55 Id. at 1620 (Burger, GJ., concurring).
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traband materials.
V. ANALYSIS OF WINSTON
The Court's decision to apply the Schmerber "reasonableness" test to surgical intrusions was well-founded. In Schmerber, the Court balanced the procedure's threat to the suspect's safety and health and the intrusiveness upon the suspect's dignitary interest in personal privacy and bodily integrity against the community's evidentiary interest in more fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence. 5 7 The competing interests that arise in extracting blood from a suspect are similarly raised when a suspect undergoes surgery for the removal of bullets. In Winston, the Court balanced the competing interests of the suspect and the state and concluded that the state's arguments concerning its evidentiary need for the bullet inside the respondent were not compelling. 5 8 By adopting a balancing test, however, lower authorities will not be precluded from ruling that a state's need for a bullet in similar settings outweighs the suspect's fourth amendment interests.
One possible criticism of the Winston decision is that it is too fact-specific. The decision arguably may not lend much precedential authority to scenarios different from the one in Winston. For example, a lower court would not be prohibited by the decision in Winston from enabling a state to compel involuntary surgical removal of a bullet from a defendant where it is lodged immediately under the surface of the skin. As the Winston Court noted, however, weighing the states' evidentiary needs against an individual's privacy interests under the fourth amendment provides few categorical answers. 5 9 The Court, therefore, wisely refrained from attempting to establish such categories.
The challenge of providing categories as guides for other authorities is illustrated by the variant decisions reached by lower courts. Courts from at least eleven states and the District of Columbia have ruled on the question of court-ordered surgery to recover evidence for criminal prosecutions. 6 0 As is suggested by the split in 
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these courts' decisions, providing a uniform constitutional standard may be extremely difficult. 6 1 The Court in Winston recognizes this difficulty and its decision enables lower authorities to apply the "reasonableness" framework on a case-by-case basis. requiring a general anesthetic be held per se unreasonable and that all surgical searches requiring a local anesthetic should rebuttably be presumed unreasonable. This approach is undesirable because it would establish a static standard preventing any courtordered surgery using a general anesthetic. There are likely to be some situations in which the state's interests are highly compelling and such presumptions would prove overly detrimental. Mandell and Richardson's bright-line proposal is, therefore, misguided.
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courts have the benefit of hearing the evidence and assessing the weight and credibility of testimony. A lower court may also have a better capacity than a reviewing court to balance the suspect's fourth amendment rights against the strength of the local community's evidentiary needs in a criminal prosecution. A lower authority will have the freedom to determine, for example, whether the evidentiary value of a bullet based on a comparison of markings, 6 2 outweighs the suspect's interests where there is little other evidence. Despite Justice Brennan's informed approach, the Winston decision can be criticized on several grounds. The balancing test applied in Winston is successful in that it provides a basic framework for lower courts. Yet, as is often the case with "reasonableness" tests, it offers little practical guidance concerning the relative weights to be assigned to each of the interests. Justice Brennan does not appear to suggest, for example, that a state is prohibited per se from compelling a surgical intrusion that requires the use of a general anesthetic. 63 The opinion fails to discuss at what point the state's evidentiary needs will outweigh the suspect's fourth amendment interests. The opinion, furthermore, does not address whether the heinousness of the crime committed should be considered in the balancing test. Thus, while extending great latitude to lower authorities may be wise in many ways, such freedom and flexibility could prove folly.
As a result of the openendedness ofJustice Brennan's opinion, lower authorities are likely to lack consistency in their interpretation of Winston and in their application of the test. One court may permit a surgical intrusion using a general anesthetic over the suspect's objections because the state has little other evidence and because the crime committed was especially heinous. Another court might prohibit the same surgery under a similar set of facts, while stressing that the intrusive nature of the surgery is offensive to the suspect's dignity and privacy.
Although categorization of any "reasonableness" test is a difficult task, the Supreme Court should have attempted to provide greater guidance to lower courts to insure more consistent and uniform decisions across all jurisdictions. Providing lower courts with an idea of the relative importance of the factors in its reasonable- 
